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d1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The degree of mobility in income is often seen as a measure of the equality of
opportunity in a society, and of the ﬂexibility and freedom of movement in the
labor market (Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1992). Greater mobility
makes the distribution of lifetime incomes more equal for a given level of single
period income inequality. On the other hand, Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) note
that too much mobility may represent income ﬂuctuations and economic inse-
curity. Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002) formalize this trade-oﬀ in a model with
both aversion to inequality and aversion to unpredictability of incomes, ﬁnding
the socially desirable level of mobility will be less than a level at which there is
full reversal of ranks over time. Nevertheless, in many developing countries, the
concern is more likely to be that there is too little, rather than too much, mo-
bility. In particular, Piketty (2000) surveys recent theoretical work which ﬁnds
that the presence of credit constraints can give rise to the possibility of “low-
mobility traps”, whereby households who need to borrow to ﬁnance investment
can take a long time to build up wealth.
Measurement of the degree of mobility using panel data on earnings is com-
plicated by the presence of measurement error, and by non-random attrition
from the panel. A simple measure of mobility is the slope coeﬃcient from a re-
gression of current period earnings on lagged earnings (e.g. Jarvis and Jenkins,
1998; Fields et al. (2003)). Classical measurement error causes the well-known
attenuation bias towards zero in the estimated slope coeﬃcient, leading one
to overstate the degree of mobility. The existing literature has attempted to
overcome the measurement error problem through the use of instrumental vari-
able methods.1 Instruments for lagged income have included lagged expenditure
(e.g. McCulloch and Baulch, 2000), subjective measures of well-being (Luttmer,
1An alternative method used in developed countries has been the use of administrative
data from payroll records, where measurement error is likely to be much less (e.g. Aaberge
et al., 2002). Such data is much less common in developing countries, and does not allow
analysis on the dynamics of earnings of the self-employed, or of total household income.
22002)2, assets and land holdings (e.g. Fields et al. (2003), Strauss et al. (2004)),
and weight (Glewwe and Nguyen, 2002).
A key condition for the validity of such instruments is that any measurement
error in the instrument is uncorrelated with the measurement error in income.
Glewwe and Nguyen (2002) question this assumption in the case of expenditure,
where individuals may systematically underreport both income or expenditure,
or interviewers may reduce the level of detailed questioning on both measures.
However, even when the instrument is uncorrelated with the measurement er-
ror, consistency of the instrumental variables estimator still requires that the
instrument also be uncorrelated with the non-measurement error component
of the error term in the data generating process. Glewwe and Nguyen state
that such an assumption is extremely unlikely to hold when variables such as
education or land, which have a causal relationship with income, are used as
instruments. In this paper we show further that if the instrument itself follows
an AR(1) process, then the instrumental variables estimator will converge to the
autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the instrument. As a result, instrumental variables
will only be consistent if the instrument is uncorrelated with the measurement
error and has the same amount of mobility as earnings. This condition appears
extremely unlikely to hold in practice.
The literature has devoted less attention to assessing the impact of attrition
on estimates of mobility. However, the typical labor force panel in developing
countries reinterviews dwelling units, rather than households, so that households
that move attrit from the sample. The Mexican Urban Labor Force Survey
(ENEU) used in this study is a quarterly rotating panel which follows this
approach, and on average loses 35 percent of the sample due to attrition over
the ﬁve periods. Thomas, Frankenberg and Smith (2001) discuss the experience
of the Indonesia Family Life Survey, which explicitly tracked movers, and do
ﬁnd that those who move are diﬀerent in terms of initial characteristics than
those who stay. Although they do not examine whether changes in income or
2Luttmer actually examines mobility in expenditure, rather than income, and uses income
and subjective well-being as instruments for expenditure.
3other economic conditions are associated with households being more likely to
move, one would expect greater geographic mobility to be associated with more
income mobility: households experiencing large positive shocks may move to
better housing while households experienced large negative shocks may migrate
or move to cheaper housing. As a result, the attrition bias will lead panel studies
to understate mobility.
This paper shows how dynamic pseudo-panel methods can be used to con-
sistently estimate the degree of income mobility when earnings contain non-
classical measurement error. A pseudo-panel tracks cohorts of individuals over
repeated cross-sectional surveys (Deaton, 1985). Construction of a pseudo-panel
involves taking cohort means within each time period, and this averaging process
eliminates individual-level measurement error. Since each household is only ob-
served once, non-random attrition becomes much less of an issue. A further
advantage is that repeated cross-sectional surveys are available in more coun-
tries and typically over longer time-periods than genuine panels. This allows
one to estimate mobility measures over many more time periods than typically
used in the panel literature. Gottschalk (1997) notes that many movements in
income are transitory, so that individuals who experience an increase in earnings
in one year will tend to have a fall in income a few years later. Therefore mo-
bility over several periods may be diﬀerent from what one would predict based
on extrapolating measures based on a one year interval.
This paper uses 58 quarters of household earnings data in Mexico over the
period 1987 to 2001 to examine earnings mobility. Mexico’s income distribu-
tion displays a high degree of cross-sectional inequality, and therefore a high
degree of income mobility is of importance in lowering inequality in lifetime
distributions of income. However, our pseudo-panel results ﬁnd very low levels
of absolute mobility in Mexico. While OLS estimation would suggest that 33
percent of the gap in income between two randomly selected households would
close within one quarter, pseudo-panel analysis ﬁnds only 1.2 percent of this gap
would be eliminated within a quarter, and only ﬁve to seven percent of income
diﬀerences disappear after ﬁve years. The OLS bias appears almost entirely
4due to measurement error and does not appear to be much oﬀset by diﬀerential
attrition of the more mobile. In contrast, while absolute mobility remains low,
conditional mobility, deﬁned as the movement in income around a household’s
ﬁxed eﬀect, is found to be quite rapid. Households which experience bad luck
or shocks to labor earnings which take them below the level of income deter-
mined by their individual attributes recover almost fully to their expected level
within two years. These ﬁndings of slow absolute mobility and rapid conditional
mobility continue to hold using full income and expenditure from an alternate
dataset. As a result, the high levels of inequality seen in a given cross-section
are likely to persist over time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses esti-
mation of mobility by OLS and IV in the presence of non-classical measurement
errors. Section 3 shows how pseudo-panel estimation can allow for consistent
estimation. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 contains the main results of
the paper while Section 6 provides an interpretation of the ﬁndings. Section 7
concludes.
2 Mobility and Measurement Error
While there are many potential measures of mobility (see Atkinson et al. (1992)),
we investigate one of the simplest measures, which is the slope coeﬃcient in a
regression of income on its lagged value. This measure is common in much of
the empirical literature (e.g. Jarvis and Jenkins, 1998; Fields et al. (2003);
Strauss et al. (2004)). Moreover, because this measure is based on a regression
framework, pseudo-panel methods and instrumental variables can be applied to
deal with measurement error. Our application will investigate mobility in labor
income, but the methods which follow can easily be applied to expenditure or
other socioeconomic variables.
Consider the data generating process for the actual log income, Y ∗
i,t of indi-
5vidual i at time period t:
Y ∗
i,t = α + βY ∗
i,t−1 + ui,t (1)
The coeﬃcient β is a measure of (im)mobility. A value of β of unity indicates
that incomes move in step, with no convergence of incomes. If β is greater
than unity, there is divergence, and β less than one indicates some convergence
of incomes. Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002) consider two aspects of economic
mobility. ‘Origin independence’ measures the degree to which future incomes do
not depend on present income. β equal to zero combined with no individual ﬁxed
eﬀects in the error term, ui,t would indicate full original independence. They
also consider a second aspect, ‘reversal’, which is the degree to which ranks are
reversed over time. A value of β less than zero would indicate some reversal,
with individuals with above mean income experiencing a fall in income and
poorer individuals getting richer. The socially optimal level of β will involve a
trade-oﬀ between the degree of aversion to inequality (which favors lower values
of β) and the degree of aversion to unpredictability of income (which favors
values of β closer to one). Consistent measurement of β is needed to assess the
degree of mobility.
However, in practice one observed data which are measured with error. One
thus observes:
Yi,t = Y ∗
i,t + εi,t (2)
We wish to place relatively weak assumptions on the measurement error εi,t.I n
particular, Bound and Krueger (1991) compare the Current Population Survey
to Social Security Administrative records in the United States and ﬁnd that
the measurement error in earnings is positively autocorrelated over two years,
and is negatively correlated with true earnings. These ﬁndings violate standard
classical measurement error assumptions, and since similar validation studies
are not available for developing countries, we wish to allow generally for the
possibility of autocorrelation and correlation with true earnings.
Substituting (2) into (1) gives the equation to be estimated in terms of
6observed income:
Yi,t = α + βYi,t−1 + ηi,t (3)
where ηi,t = ui,t + εi,t − βεi,t−1 (4)








where yi,t−1 = Yi,t−1 − (1/N)
PN
i=1 Yi,t−1. One can then show under standard
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The term θOLS is the asymptotic bias and shows that OLS will be inconsistent
in general. This inconsistency arises due to the following terms:
i) E (ui,t,Y i,t−1), the covariance between the current period shock to earn-
ings and last periods measured earnings. The standard concern here is the
present of individual ﬁxed eﬀects in the error term ui,t, which will lead
to this term being positive. This term will also not be zero if earnings
shocks, ui,t are autocorrelated.
ii) Cov(εi,t,εi,t−1), the covariance between this period’s and last period’s
measurement error terms will be non-zero if measurement errors are au-
tocorrelated. Based on the U.S. validation studies, we would expect this






, the covariance between the measurement error and
true earnings. The results of Bound and Krueger (1991) suggest this term
7will be negative. In addition, if the measurement errors are positively
autocorrelated, then the covariance between last period’s true earnings







iv) Va r(εi,t−1), the variance of the measurement error. If there are no ﬁxed










This is the classic attenuation bias towards zero, and would lead one to
conclude there is more mobility in income than there actually is.
2.1 Instrumental Variables
In recognition of the eﬀect of measurement error on mobility estimates, several
authors have attempted to use instrumental variables methods. As discussed
in the introduction, instruments used for income have included education, ex-
penditure, asset holdings, and weight. Let Zi,t−1 be the instrument. Then it is
assumed that the actual data are related to the instrument according to:
Y ∗
i,t−1 = φ + γZi,t−1 + vi,t−1 (6)
Where γ 6=0is a necessary condition for instrument relevance. Writing this in
terms of the observed Yi,t−1 then gives the ﬁrst-stage equation:
Yi,t−1 = φ + γZi,t−1 + vi,t−1 + εi,t−1 (7)
Let zi,t−1 = Zi,t−1−(1/N)
PN
i=1 Zi,t−1 denote the demeaned Zi,t−1.T h ei n s t r u -
mental variables estimator of β b a s e do ne q u a t i o n( 7 )b e i n gu s e da saﬁrst-stage
















In order to determine the probability limit of this estimator, we need to impose
some structure on the time series properties of the instrument. Let us assume
that:
Zi,t = µ + ρZi,t−1 + ωi,t (9)
This formulation allows us to vary the degree of autocorrelation in the instru-
ment by varying ρ, and to also consider the case of time invariant instruments
such as education, for which ρ =0and ωi,t = ωi. Appendix 1 then shows that




γ (ρ − β)Va r(Zi,t−1)+E (εi,tZi,t−1) − βE (εi,t−1Zi,t−1)+λ
γVa r(Zi,t−1)+E (Zi,t−1εi,t−1)+E (Zi,t−1vi,t−1)
(10)
where
λ = γE (ωi,tZi,t−1)+E (vi,tZi,t−1) − βE (vi,t−1Zi,t−1) (11)
Equation (10) thus shows that consistency of the instrumental variables es-
timator requires that all of the following conditions hold:3
1. The instrument Zi,t−1 is uncorrelated with both the current and lagged
measurement errors. This appears unlikely to hold when using expenditure
as an instrument for income, but appears plausible for measures such as
education and body weight.
3Of course it is theoretically possible that the bias terms could cancel one another out,
so that we could obtain consistency without the separate bias terms all being zero, but this
appears unlikely in practice.
92. λ =0 . This requires that the instrument, Zi,t−1 be uncorrelated with
the error terms ωi,t, vi,t and vi,t−1. This condition will be violated if the
true data, Y ∗
i,t contain individual ﬁxed eﬀects which are correlated with
the instrument, or if the dynamic process governing the evolution of the
instrument itself contains an individual ﬁxed eﬀect. Again, this restriction
appears problematic when using expenditure as an instrument for income,
since one might expect individual ﬁxed eﬀects in income and expenditure
to be correlated.
3. The degree of autocorrelation in the instrument must perfectly match the
degree of autocorrelation in income, that is, ρ = β. This condition is
unlikely to be met by many of the instruments used in the literature. In
particular, there is no reason to expect the degree of autocorrelation in
asset holdings or in body weight to be the same as in earnings. Note that




That is, the instrumental variables estimator will converge to the auto-
correlation coeﬃcient in the instrument. Hence, if one uses an instrument
which does not vary over time, such as education of adults, then ρ =1 ,
and b βIV will converge to unity.4 If one uses an instrument which is white
noise, then b βIV will converge to zero.
These three conditions are unlikely to be met simultaneously by most of
the candidate instruments used thusfar in the literature. Instruments such as
repeated measures of income are most likely to display the same degree of au-
tocorrelation as true earnings, but also therefore likely to have correlated mea-
surement errors and also potentially have individual ﬁxed eﬀects correlated with
those in genuine earnings. Instruments such as body weight, education, and land
4Glewwe and Nyugen (2002) also show that the correlation coeﬃcient between current and
lagged income will be unity in their IV method when using an instrument which does not vary
over time.
10holdings are less likely to have measurement errors correlated with the measure-
ment error in earnings, but also be less likely to display identical dynamics to
income. As a result, the above analysis suggests that all such IV estimators will
deliver inconsistent estimates of mobility.
2.2 Instrumental Variables with Individual Eﬀects
It is common practice in dynamic panel data estimation to worry about the
presence of individual ﬁxed eﬀects. As seen above, even when there is no mea-
surement error, the presence of individual ﬁxed eﬀects can result in inconsistent
estimates of β from both OLS and from certain instrumental variable estima-
tors. The standard solution is to diﬀerence the data and then use further lags of
income as an instrument. As our panels are very short, we will follow Arellano
(1989) in using Yi,t−2 as an instrument for ∆Yi,t−1. The Arellano instrumental










Assume that after removing individual ﬁxed eﬀects, the ui,t are not autocorre-
lated and are independent of Y ∗
i,s for s<t , and are independent of the mea-
surement error. Then if the measurement error is classical, one can show that















Therefore with classical measurement error, the Arellano instrumental variables
estimator will be biased towards zero for 0 < β < 1. The presence of measure-
ment error will therefore lead this estimator to overstate the degree of mobility.5
5Again if we allow for non-classical measurement error the bias term becomes more com-
plicated and theoretically diﬃcult to sign.
113 Pseudo-panel Estimation
We propose using pseudo-panel methods to consistently estimate the degree of
income mobility in the presence of measurement error. A pseudo-panel tracks
cohorts of individuals, such as birth cohorts, or birth-education cohorts, over
repeated cross-sectional surveys. Since a new sample of individuals is taken
in each period, the use of a pseudo-panel will also greatly reduce the eﬀect
of attrition on mobility estimates. The use of the pseudo-panel will capture
mobility which is accompanied by movement within the cross-sectional survey
domain. However, it will not capture mobility which arises from migration into
or out of the survey area. Moﬃtt (1993), Collado (1997), McKenzie (2001,
2004) and Verbeek and Vella (forthcoming) discuss conditions under which one
can consistently estimate linear dynamic models with pseudo-panels. Our aim
here is to show that these methods can also deal with the measurement error
problems facing panel data models.
Begin by taking cohort averages of equation (3) over the nc individuals
observed in cohort c at time t :
Y c(t),t = α + βY c(t),t−1 +
uc(t),t + εc(t),t − βεc(t),t−1 (15)
where Y c(t),t =( 1 /nc)
Pnc
i=1 Yi(t),t denotes the sample mean of Y over the in-
dividuals in cohort c observed at time t. With repeated cross-sections, diﬀer-
ent individuals are observed each time period. As a result, the lagged mean
Y c(t),t−1, representing the mean income in period t − 1 of the individuals in
cohort c observed at time t, is not observed. Therefore we replace the unob-
served terms with the sample means over the individuals who are observed at
time t−1, leading to the following regression for cohorts c =1 ,2,...,C and time
periods t =2 ,...,T:
Y c(t),t = α + βY c(t−1),t−1 +




Y c(t),t−1 − Y c(t−1),t−1
¢
As shown in McKenzie (2004), as the number of individuals in each cohort
becomes large, λc(t),t converges to zero, and hence we will ignore this term in
what follows. Consider then the mean measurement error in income at time t
for individuals in cohort c, εc(t),t. As the number of individuals in the cohort













The last equality assumes that there is no cohort-level component to measure-
ment errors. We can allow for cohort-speciﬁce ﬀects in equation (16), in which
case we need only assume that there is no time-varying cohort-level component
to measurement errors. This assumption does allow for arbitrary autocorrela-
tion in individual measurement errors over time, and for measurement errors
to be correlated with true values, provided that this correlation does not vary
at the cohort level over time. Under these assumptions, construction of the
pseudo-panel, by averaging over the observations in a cohort, will average out
the measurement errors.
As a result, with suﬃcient observations per cohort, the measurement er-
rors do not aﬀect the consistency of estimates from equation (16). The precise
method for estimating equation (16) depends on the assumptions one wishes to
make about the individual level shocks to earnings, ui,t, and on the dimensions
of the pseudo-panel in practice. McKenzie (2004) discusses these choices. In
particular, if the ui,t contain individual ﬁxed eﬀects but no time-varying cohort-
level component, one can estimate β consistently by OLS on the cohort average
equation (16) with the inclusion of cohort dummies. This will be consistent as
the number of individuals per cohort gets large. If the individual level shocks
to earnings contain a common cohort component, then in addition to a large
number of individuals per cohort, one also needs a large number of cohorts or
a large number of time periods for consistency. With many cohorts and less
13individuals per cohort, instrumental variables methods can be used in which
lagged cohort means are used as instruments (see Collado, 1997). In our em-
pirical context we choose cohorts to allow for a large number of individuals per
cohort, and therefore can use OLS on the cohort means for estimation.
3.1 Mobility and heterogeneity
The most basic speciﬁcation is therefore to assume that there are no individ-
ual ﬁxed eﬀects, in which case one uses the pseudo-panel to estimate β in the
following equation:
Y c(t),t = α + βY c(t−1),t−1 + ωc(t),t (17)
If Y is the level of income, then β < 1 then tells us that a household with income
below the mean in period t − 1 will experience more rapid income growth than
richer households. This is known as absolute convergence in the macro growth
literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin,1999).
If the data generating process contains individual ﬁxed eﬀects, one can in-
stead include cohort ﬁxed eﬀects, and estimate β in the following equation:
Y c(t),t = αc + βY c(t−1),t−1 + ωc(t),t (18)
An estimate of β which is less than unity from equation (18) can be interpreted
as saying that a household which is below its own mean income grows faster.
This is called conditional convergence in the growth literature. Allowing for
individual ﬁxed eﬀects greatly increases the speed of convergence across coun-
tries. However, as Islam (1995, p. 1162) observes, “by being more successful
(through the panel framework) in controlling for further sources of diﬀerence
i nt h es t e a d ys t a t eo fi n c o m e ,w eh a v e ,a tt h es a m et i m e ,m a d et h eo b s e r v e d
convergence hollower...There is probably little solace to be derived from ﬁnding
that countries in the world are converging at a faster rate, when the points to
which they are converging remain very diﬀerent”.
An analogous argument can be made in our context of income mobility in
household data. Estimation of equation (17) gives us an estimate of ‘absolute
14mobility’, which tells us the extent to which households move around in the
overall income distribution. This is the measure that most closely corresponds
to the idea that mobility can lower lifetime inequality and provide equality of
opportunity. Estimation of equation (18) in contrast can be thought of as giving
an estimate of ‘conditional mobility’, telling us whether households move around
relative to their own average income. This relates somewhat to the concept of
mobility as a measure of ﬂexibility and eﬃciency of the labor market. We will
provide estimates of mobility under both speciﬁcations and discuss further the
interpretation of these two measures in Section 6.
4D a t a
To investigate earnings mobility in Mexico we use the Encuesta Nacional de Em-
pleo Urbano(ENEU), Mexico’s national urban employment survey, conducted
by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI). The
sampling unit is a dwelling or housing structure, and demographic information
is collected on the household or households occupying each dwelling. An em-
ployment questionnaire is then administered for each individual aged 12 and
above in the household, providing detailed information on occupation, labor
hours, labor earnings, and employment conditions. The survey is designed as
a rotating panel, with households interviewed for ﬁve consecutive quarters be-
fore exiting the survey. In each new round the household questionnaire records
absent members, adds any new members who have joined the household, and
records any changes in schooling that have taken place. If none of the original
group of household members is found to be living in the dwelling unit in the
follow-up survey, the household is recorded as a new household (INEGI, 1998).
As in many labor force surveys in developing countries, the interviewers do not
track households which move, so any household which moves attrits from the
panel.
W eu s ed a t af r o mt h eﬁrst quarter of 1987 through to the second quarter
15of 20016, providing 58 quarters of data. Over this period the ENEU expanded
coverage from 16 cities in 1987 to 34 cities by the end of 1992 and 44 cities by
the second quarter of 2001. We include all 39 cities present by the end of 1994,
although our results are robust to restricting the sample to just the 16 cities
present in all years.
The ENEU only collects data on labor earnings for each household member
in their principal occupation. We add this over household members and deﬂate
by the Consumer Price Index for the relevant quarter from the Bank of Mexico
to obtain real household labor earnings. To focus only on households for whom
labor earnings are likely to be a main source of income, we restrict our sample
to households with heads aged 25 to 49 years old. On average two percent of the
observations have household labor income of zero. Using data from the ENIGH
income and expenditure survey, which does include non-labor sources of income,
we calculate that labor income represents 95 percent of total monetary income
for urban households with heads in the 25-49 year old age range. In Section 5.2
we examine how mobility in labor earnings compares to estimated mobility in
full income and in expenditure.
For our panel data analysis we then have 54 ﬁve-quarter panels, beginning
with the panel of 3930 households which were sampled from the ﬁrst quarter of
1987 through to the ﬁrst quarter of 1988, and ending with the panel of 11,158
households that were sampled from the second quarter of 2000 through to the
second quarter of 2001. We use unbalanced panels. Attrition is comparable to
dwelling-based labor force surveys in other developing countries. Ten percent of
households are observed for only one quarter, while approximately 65 percent
of households can be followed for all ﬁve quarters.
We form pseudo-panels based on the household head’s year of birth and
education level. Cohorts are deﬁned by the interaction of ﬁve year birth intervals
and three education levels (primary scho o l i n go rl e s s ,7t o1 2y e a r se d u c a t i o n ,
and more than 12 years education). For example, all household heads born
6Since the second quarter of 2001, the ENEU was replaced by the ENE, which has now
become the ENET - a national quarterly employment survey.
16between 1960 and 1964 with primary schooling or less would form one cohort.
The household head is deﬁned as the person recognized as the head by the other
household members and is generally male. McKenzie (2003) shows that there
is no signiﬁcant change in who is the head for individuals aged 25 to 49, even
during the peso crisis in 1995.
A potential concern with the panel data is that more economically mobile
households may move, and so the panel will be a selected sample of less mobile
households. In order to ensure that the pseudo-panel does not suﬀer from the
same problem, we construct our pseudo-panel using only the households who are
in their ﬁr s tw a v eo ft h ei n t e r v i e w .A sar e s u l t ,w eu s ej u s to v e r2 0p e r c e n to ft h e
households available in any given cross-section, since the remaining households
are those which are being re-interviewed. We restrict the sample further to
cohorts with more than 100 observations in a given wave in order to be able to
apply the asymptotic theory developed above which relies on a large number of
observations per cohort. Approximately 9 percent of cohort-period observations
have fewer than 100 households, and including these additional observations
does not qualitatively aﬀect our results. After these restrictions, we are left
with a pseudo-panel over 58 quarters with 842 cohort-quarter observations.
5R e s u l t s
Panel A of Table 1 provides the estimates of the coeﬃcient on quarterly lagged
log income from a variety of diﬀerent estimation methods. Column 1 provides
the panel data OLS estimate, 0.668, which is signiﬁcantly less than unity and
suggests substantial mobility within a quarterly period. Adding cohort dummy
variables in Column 2 lowers the coeﬃcient estimate further to 0.598. Columns
3 and 4 provide the panel data instrumental variables estimates. As a labor
f o r c es u r v e y ,t h eE N E Uc o n t a i n sf e wo ft h ev a r i a b l e sc o m m o n l yu s e di nt h e
literature as instruments. We use the education of the household head, and an
asset index constructed as the ﬁrst principal component from questions on the
17household dwelling unit7. Both of these variables are highly autocorrelated over
time, and in accordance the result in equation (12), we obtain an estimate of
β very close to unity, 0.99. In contrast, when we employ the second lag of log
income as an instrument and employ the Arellano (1992) estimation method,
t h ee s t i m a t eo fβ is -0.062, which would indicate full origin independence and
in fact some slight reversal in income. This accords with our theoretical result
that this estimate will be biased towards zero.
Columns 5 and 6 provide our pseudo-panel estimates of β.W h e nw ed on o t
allow for individual eﬀects through cohort-speciﬁc intercepts, the estimate of β
is 0.988, while after allowing for individual eﬀects we obtain an estimate of β of
0.832. Comparing these results with those in Columns 1 through 4, we see that
the OLS estimates greatly overstate mobility, as does the Arellano estimate.
The IV estimate using instruments which are strongly autocorrelated happens
to give results similar to the pseudo-panel estimate for absolute mobility. This
is a consequence of mobility being low over this quarterly period: as equation
(12) showed, we would expect to get a coeﬃcient of 0.99 from the IV estimation
here regardless of the level of mobility in income, since education and the asset
index do not vary much from one period to the next.
Approximately two percent of our households have zero labor income in a
given period, and are omitted when calculating log income. In Panel B of Table
1 we therefore repeat the analysis using the level of income, which allows us to
include these zeros. The results are qualitatively very similar to those in Panel
A, suggesting that the exclusion of these few zero observations does not make
as u b s t a n t i v ed i ﬀerence.
The use of pseudo-panel analysis allows us to examine mobility over longer
time periods than would be possible with the ﬁve quarter genuine panels avail-
7The asset index is the ﬁrst principal component of a series of questions about the charac-
teristics of the dwelling unit (type of ﬂoor, materials used in the roof and walls, total rooms,
whether the household has a separate kitchen, and access to electricity, sewerage, water and
telephone). These questions have only been asked since the third quarter of 1994, and are
only asked once a year, so by assumption are perfectly autocorrelated within the year.
18able in Mexico. Table 2 provides estimates of the mobility coeﬃcient over one
quarter, one year, two year, and ﬁve year time periods. Since not all cohorts
are aged between 25 and 49 in every quarter, less cohort-period observations are
available for longer intervals. Table 2 presents results from the balanced pseudo-
panel, where the same cohort-quarter observations are used for estimation over
diﬀerent time lags.8 Columns 1 through 4 provide the estimates of absolute
mobility, while Columns 5 through 8 include cohort ﬁxed eﬀects and therefore
give measures of conditional mobility. Absolute mobility increases slightly as
one increases the time frame, but the estimate of β is still 0.933 over two year
intervals and 0.950 over ﬁve year intervals.9 Thus while poorer households expe-
rience slightly faster income growth than richer households, a household which
has 10 percent higher income than another household today is estimated to still
have 9.5 percent higher income ﬁve years later.
In contrast, Table 2 shows a high degree of conditional mobility. A ten
percent diﬀerence in income between two households with the same ﬁxed eﬀect
is reduced to a 8.3 percent diﬀerence after one quarter, a 5.5 percent diﬀerence
after one year, and only a 0.5 percent diﬀerence after two years. By ﬁve years,
the households have reversed rankings.
5.1 Mobility and Attrition
Measurement error will result in both OLS and IV methods giving inconsistent
measures of mobility. However, a second source of potential bias in mobility
estimates based on genuine panel data is that of non-random attrition. This
is particularly likely to be a concern in many developing country contexts in
which panel surveys track dwelling units, rather than households, over time.
Thomas, Frankenberg and Smith (2001) note that this is the standard protocol
for follow-up surveys conducted as part of the World Bank’s Living Standards
Measurement Study, with second round follow-up rates of 87 percent in Cote
8The point estimates for the unbalanced pseudo-panel are very similar to those for the
balanced pseudo-panel and are available upon request.
9The ﬁve-year coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant from the two-year coeﬃcient.
19d’Ivoire, 55 percent in Peru, and 50 percent in Ghana. In the Mexican urban
labor force survey used in this paper, 65 percent of households are followed for
all ﬁve quarters. Thomas et al. (2001) report that the follow-up rate in the
second round of the Indonesia Family Life Survey would have been 84 percent
instead of 94 percent if they had not tracked households which move. Failure to
follow households which move is likely to understate mobility in both the OLS
and IV estimates, since it appears likely that households which move dwellings
are likely to have experienced greater income changes than households which
stay put. Although correction for attrition is possible under certain structural
assumptions, most studies of mobility do not attempt to address this issue.10
We therefore now investigate how much of the diﬀerence between our pseudo-
panel estimates and panel data estimates is due to non-random attrition rather
than measurement error. We begin by examining the determinants of who
attrits. Table 3 presents marginal eﬀects from probit estimation of two types of
attrition. Column 1 considers households which attrit after only one round of
interviews. These household heads are younger, less likely to be married, have
smaller household sizes and larger incomes than household heads who remain for
t w oo rm o r ew a v e so ft h es u r v e y .H o w e v e r ,w h i l et h e s ed i ﬀerences are signiﬁcant
given the large number of observations, the magnitude of the eﬀects is rather
small. In Columns 2 through 5, we look at households which appear in the ﬁrst
two quarters of the survey and examine the determinants of attriting before their
full ﬁve quarters are completed. This allows us to examine whether attrition
is related to the change in income experienced by the household between the
ﬁrst two waves. We ﬁnd that both the change in income or log income, and the
absolute value of this change, are positively associated with subsequent attrition
from the panel. However, a one standard deviation change in either the change
in income or absolute value of the change in income is associated with less than
a 0.01 increase in the probability of attrition. Figure 1 shows that the kernel
density of the change in income between periods 1 and 2 is very similar for
10An exception is Lokshin and Ravallion (2004), who include a correction for attrition in
their study of non-linear income dynamics.
20households which attrit to those who do not.
These results suggest that while attrition is more common amongst house-
holds which experience greater income mobility, the magnitude of the bias is
likely to be rather small. However, a concern might be that households which
experience the largest absolute changes in income move houses and attrit out
of the survey before the next quarter’s survey can be completed. Since these
income movements are by assumption unobserved, we can not directly examine
them. Instead, in Table 4 we examine how much our pseudo-panel estimates
of absolute and conditional mobility diﬀer when we consider only households
which don’t attrit. We classify households according to whether they partici-
pate in all ﬁve quarters of the ENEU survey or not, and restrict our analysis
to the cohort-quarter observations where we have at least 100 observations per
cohort in each group. Column 1 repeats the quarterly pseudo-panel estimate
of β in the absolute mobility regression for the full sample. Column 2 creates
a pseudo-panel of non-attritors by taking the ﬁrst wave observations for house-
holds which are observed in all ﬁve waves. Column 3 creates a pseudo-panel
of attritors, by taking the ﬁrst wave observations for households which are not
observed for at least one of the four remaining waves. The estimate of β for
the non-attritors pseudo-panel of 0.987 is very close in magnitude and not sta-
tistically diﬀerent from the 0.991 coeﬃcient for the full sample. The attritors
pseudo-panel estimate of 0.977 suggests slightly greater absolute mobility among
the attriting households11, but one can not reject equality of the coeﬃcients in
the non-attritors and attritors samples. These results therefore suggest that
there is very little bias from attrition in estimating mobility with a balanced
panel.
Columns 4 through 8 examine conditional mobility of the non-attriting and
11Note that households in this pseudo-panel are by deﬁnition households that would attrit
in the next 4 quarters whenever you sample them. This is a subset of the group of households
which happen to attrit in an observed ﬁve-quarter period. They are thus households which
are likely to have even greater geographic and income mobility than the average attriting
household.
21attriting households. In Columns 5 and 6 we restrict the cohort eﬀects to be
equal for the two samples, while Columns 7 and 8 allow them to diﬀer. Condi-
tional mobility is found to not diﬀer between the two groups when we restrict
the cohort eﬀects to be the same for non-attritors and attritors. However, once
we allow the cohort eﬀects to vary, the attritors do show somewhat greater
conditional mobility than the non-attritors. A 10 percent diﬀerence in income
between two households with the same ﬁxed eﬀect would be reduced to a 8.2 per-
cent diﬀerence after one quarter in the non-attritors sample, and a 7.5 percent
diﬀerence in the attritors sample.
Overall these results show that attrition has a rather small impact on mea-
surement of mobility, and therefore that measurement error is the main source
of bias in the OLS genuine panel estimation. While those who attrit are exhibit
slightly more income mobility, the fact that 35 percent of households attrit over
the ﬁve quarter panel leads us to speculate that changes in income are only
o n eo fal a r g en u m b e ro fr e a s o n sw h yh o u s e holds attrit. A host of idiosyncratic
reasons for non-response, temporary absence, and refusal to answer are likely
to mitigate the impact of attrition arising from income changes.
5.2 Mobility in Full Income and in Expenditure
The above analysis has been for mobility of household labor earnings in urban
Mexico. We can compare mobility in labor earnings with mobility in total house-
hold income and in expenditure using Mexico’s national income and expenditure
survey, the Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso-Gasto de los Hogares (ENIGH). The
ENIGH has been carried out in third quarter of the year on a biannual basis
since 1992, and we use the six surveys from 1992 to 2002. Each round surveys
a new random sample of approximately 10,000 to 14,000 households, so we do
not have a panel of households. We can, however, form cohorts based on the
same ﬁve year birth intervals and three levels of education of the household
head as above, and follow cohorts over time. We consider two subsamples of the
data. The ﬁrst consists of urban households, deﬁned as households in areas of
22population 100,000 or more, which allows comparison with the ENEU survey.
The second is rural households in areas of population of 15,000 or fewer. Out
of the 105 cohort-period observations, we have 82 observations in urban areas
and only 53 observations in rural areas for which 100 or more households are
surveyed within the cohort.
We examine mobility in four diﬀerent measures of household resources. The
ﬁrst is household income from the primary occupation of each member, which
i st h em e a s u r eu s e di nt h eE N E U .T h es e c o nd, total monetary income, includes
all household cash income, including income earned from transfers, pensions,
rent, interest, and from non-primary jobs. The third measure, full income,
adds non-monetary sources of household income, which includes the value of all
home-produced consumption and of any goods received as transfers. The fourth
measure is full expenditure, which includes all monetary expenditure and home-
produced consumption items. Over the six survey rounds household primary
labor earnings has a correlation of 0.91 with total monetary income, 0.83 with
full income, and 0.58 with full expenditure.
Panel A of Table 5 presents the estimated slope coeﬃcients from equation
(17) for these four measures. For urban households the four measures give
very similar levels of absolute mobility. The estimates of β range from 0.86 to
0.89. The rural estimates range from 0.65 (primary wage income) to 0.80 (full
expenditure). The point estimates would therefore suggest that there is more
absolute mobility in rural areas than in urban areas, and that rural wage income
is more mobile than rural expenditure. However the limited number of rural
observations results in large standard errors and we can not reject equality of
the rural and urban coeﬃcients. The coeﬃcient on log primary wage income
for urban households is 0.87 compared to 0.93 for the equivalent measure in the
ENEU data. This diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Panel B of Table 5 adds cohort ﬁxed eﬀects and presents the estimated slope
coeﬃcients from equation (18). The point estimates suggest very high rates of
conditional mobility, with the slope coeﬃcients close to zero. The point esti-
mates also show less conditional mobility in expenditure than in wage income.
23The ENIGH data only includes 6 time periods, so with the inclusion of cohort
ﬁxed eﬀects, identiﬁcation of the slope coeﬃcient comes from within-cohort
changes in income over this small number of periods. As a result, the standard
errors are large, giving wide conﬁdence intervals for conditional mobility. Nev-
ertheless, the coeﬃcient of 0.08 for urban primary wage income is very close to
the 0.05 coeﬃcient obtained using the ENEU data.
6I n t e r p r e t a t i o n
Our results show rather limited absolute mobility in income and expenditure in
Mexico, but rapid conditional mobility. In order to interpret this result further,
recall the data generating equation for household income at time t given in (1),
written to explicitly include the individual ﬁxed eﬀects:
Y ∗
i,t = αi + βY ∗
i,t−1 + ui,t (19)



















This partitions current household income into a term due to the household’s
ﬁxed eﬀect in income growth, a term which represents the eﬀect of initial diﬀer-
ences in household income, and a term which represents the cumulative impact
of shocks to labor earnings. Comparing the current income of households i and
j,w et h e nh a v et h a t :
Y ∗
i,t − Y ∗
















s (ui,t−s − uj,t−s) (21)
24High rates of conditional mobility then imply that if household j has lower cur-
rent income than household i due to having lower initial income (Y ∗
j,0 <Y∗
i,0), or
a series of bad luck in earnings innovations, household j will rapidly experience
faster income growth than household i. However, more rapid conditional mo-
bility only acts to slow the divergence in incomes which comes from diﬀerences
in ﬁxed eﬀects. When 0 < β ≤ 1, αi > αj will cause the income gap between
household i and j to widen each period, with the rate of expansion greater the
larger is β.W h e nβ =0(origin independence), initial diﬀerences in income and
diﬀerences in earnings innovations will have no eﬀect on current diﬀerences in
income, but incomes will always diﬀer by αi − αj.
Taking cross-sectional variances of equation (20) allows us to see the impli-


























Cross-sectional inequality in incomes then depends on the degree of inequality in
ﬁxed eﬀects, inequality in initial incomes, and inequality in earnings shocks. A
higher degree of conditional mobility reduces inequality by lessening inequalities
in initial incomes and in earnings shocks, but inequality may still remain high
if there is considerable variation in the ﬁxed eﬀects across households.
In terms of the concepts used to motivate the study of mobility, one interpre-
tation is to consider the αi’s as measuring a combination of innate diﬀerences in
earnings ability and of diﬀerences in ‘opportunity’. Inequality in the ﬁxed eﬀects
therefore would reﬂect diﬀerences in the education and health care of individu-
als, as well as factors such as discrimination which prevents certain individuals
from being able to work in particular occupations. Under this view, β can then
be seen as measuring the degree of ﬂexibility and freedom in the labor market.
Given predetermined individual attributes, β measures how rapidly individuals
who are earning too little or too much relative to their individual abilities and
25opportunities regress to their mean level of earnings.
Our ﬁnding of slow absolute mobility but rapid conditional mobility has sev-
eral implications for further study of Mexican income diﬀerences. Our ﬁnding of
rapid conditional mobility suggests that households are able to recover quickly
from bad luck and shocks to labor earnings, and therefore that the high level
of inequality in Mexican income is not due to income shocks having long-term
eﬀects. However, the high rate of conditional mobility coupled with the fact
that absolute mobility remains low means that household ﬁxed eﬀects are im-
portant and that income diﬀerences among households will persist over many
years. These ﬁxed eﬀects represent everything speciﬁc to a household that has
a persistent eﬀect on their income. This includes the education, language, gen-
der, and birth cohort of the household head; household demographic factors;
the institutional environment facing a particular household; and other factors
that determine labor income such as innate ability, ability to work with others,
and entrepreneurial prowess. The challenge for future work is to determine the
types of policy interventions which can reduce diﬀerences in these ﬁxed eﬀects.
Examples may include interventions in health and education and improvements
in labor market institutions.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We have shown that dynamic pseudo-panel estimation can be used to consis-
tently estimate the degree of earnings mobility, even in the presence of non-
classical measurement error. In contrast, OLS and instrumental variables es-
timators will give biased estimates. Although pseudo-panel estimation also
greatly reduces the potential bias from attrition of the most mobile, in practice
we ﬁnd that most of the bias in genuine panel estimation in the Mexican case
is due to measurement error, and not attrition.
Our results indicate that overall mobility in earnings, income, and expendi-
ture, is low in Mexico, whereas households are quite mobile around their indi-
vidual eﬀects. This suggests a role for policy interventions which aim to lower
26inequality amongst households in the attributes they bring to the labor market,
such as the education and health interventions occurring under the Oportu-
nidades program. In companion work (Antman and McKenzie, 2005), we are
investigating whether there are non-linearities in earnings dynamics, which cou-
pled with individual heterogeneity may result in the low levels of mobility we
observe being accompanied by poverty traps.
Appendix 1:
Consider:












Let us consider each of the various components of the numerator of the fraction














→ E (εi,t−1zi,t−1) (25)
Consider next the term (1/N)
PN
i=1 ui,tzi,t−1. To examine this term, ﬁrst sub-
stitute equation (9) into (7) to get:
Yi,t = φ + γµ + γρZi,t−1 + γωi,t + vi,t + εi,t (26)
Next substitute (7) into (3) to get:
Yi,t = α + βφ+ βγZi,t−1 + βvi,t−1 + ui,t + εi,t (27)
Equating equations (27) and (26) then gives:
27ui,t =( φ + γµ − α − βφ)+γ (ρ − β)Zi,t−1
+γωi,t + vi,t − βvi,t−1 (28)







→ γ (ρ − β)Va r(Zi,t−1)+λ (29)
where
λ = γE (ωi,tZi,t−1)+E (vi,tZi,t−1) − βE (vi,t−1Zi,t−1) (30)







→ γVa r(Zi,t−1)+E (Zi,t−1εi,t−1)+E (Zi,t−1vi,t−1) (31)
Substituting (24), (25), (29) and (31) into (23) gives equation (10).
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Figure 1: Kernel Density of Change in Log Income between 
Periods 1 and 2 by Attrition Status 
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 TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES FOR QUARTERLY ENEU DATA
PANEL A: LOG SPECIFICATION
Dependent Variable: Log Real Household Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV A-IV Pseudo Pseudo
Panel Panel
Quarterly Lag of Household Income 0.668 0.598 0.990 -0.062 0.988 0.832
T-statistic 955.85 791.23 213.59 -2.36 159.14 45.25
[95% confidence interval] [.666,.669] [.597,.600] [.981,.999] [-.114,-.011] [.976,1.000] [.796,.868]
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Cohort Effects No Yes No --- No Yes
Household-quarter observations: 1113172 1112464 165275 757561 --- ---
Cohort-quarter observations: --- --- --- --- 842 842
Adjusted R squared: 0.4508 0.4731 0.9679 0.9703
PANEL B: LEVELS SPECIFICATION
Dependent Variable: Real Household Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV A-IV Pseudo Pseudo
Panel Panel
Quarterly Lag of Household Income 0.376 0.316 0.999 0.012 0.973 0.738
T-statistic 447.64 366.61 88.83 4.97 103.64 32.86
[95% confidence interval] [.375, .378] [.315, .318] [.977, 1.021] [.007, .017] [.954,.991] [.694,.782]
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cohort Effects No Yes No --- No Yes
Household-quarter observations: 1147860 1147127 169193 787094 --- ---
Cohort-quarter observations: --- --- --- --- 842 842
Adjusted R squared: 0.1486 0.1862 0.9274 0.9362
Notes:
IV uses education of the household head and an asset index as instruments for lagged income; only
for households observed in the third period.
A-IV denotes the Arellano (1989) instrumental variables estimator, which differences the data and
uses Yi,t-2  as an instrument for the lagged first difference. 
All cohort-period observations are averages based on at least 100 household observationsTABLE 2: MOBILITY OVER DIFFERENT TIME INTERVALS
Pseudo-Panel Estimates from the ENEU
Dependent Variable: Log Real Household Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quarterly Yearly 2-Year 5-Year Quarterly Yearly 2-Year 5-Year
Lagged Log Household Income 0.988 0.963 0.936 0.950 0.855 0.536 0.051 -0.498
T-statistic 139.59 76.8 50.75 31.26 34.57 13.44 1.12 -13.63
[95% confidence interval] [.974,1.002] [.938,.987] [.899,.972] [.890,1.010] [.807,.904] [.458,.614] [ -.038,.140] [ -.570,-.427]
Cohort Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort-quarter observations: 477 477 477 477 477 477 477 477
Adjusted R squared: 0.9762 0.9253 0.844 0.6722 0.977 0.9406 0.9174 0.9411TABLE 3: WHO ATTRITS?









Independent Variables: dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX
Initial Income of Household 8.05E-08 1.38E-06 8.59E-07 5.86E-07 7.06E-07
(9.52) (32.42) (26.94) (13.18) (22.97)
Change in Income between periods 1&2 * --- 7.96E-07 0.003 2.39E-07 0.014
(20.69) (6.67) (5.57) (20.39)
Age of Household Head -0.003 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020
(14.65) (37.36) (36.49) (37.02) (36.60)
Age Squared of Household Head 3.020E-05 2.135E-04 2.122E-04 2.118E-04 2.123E-04
(11.05) (29.37) (28.73) (29.14) (28.75)
Household Size -0.003 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(20.73) (34.25) (30.42) (31.87) (30.27)
Number of Children in Household 0.002 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006
(9.56) (15.39) (12.67) (13.30) (12.48)
Male 0.005 0.020 0.023 0.021 0.023
(12.64) (19.20) (20.78) (19.69) (20.66)
Married -0.009 -0.041 -0.043 -0.041 -0.042
(24.55) (44.50) (44.42) (44.15) (44.08)
Education Dummies
d Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1610094 1468273 1423132 1468273 1423132
Pseudo R squared 0.0128 0.0145 0.0141 0.0142 0.0144
Change in Probability due to 1 SD rise in initial income
c 7.95E-04 1.37E-02 8.50E-03 5.76E-03 6.96E-03
Change in Probability due to 1 SD rise in change in income variable --- 8.02E-03 2.17E-03 2.25E-03 6.39E-03
*Change in Income Variable --- Inc2-Inc1 Ln(Inc2)-Ln(Inc1) Abs(Inc2-Inc1) Abs[Ln(Inc2)-Ln(Inc1)]
Notes
a Attrit=1 if household only present for 1st interview; Attrit=0 if household present for longer than 1st interview
b Dropout=1 if household left anytime after 2nd interview; Dropout=0 if household present for entire panel (5 interviews)
Absolute value of Z-statistics in parentheses
c Evaluated at the means of all other variables
d Coefficients on education dummies are negative and statistically significant for all dummies in all specifications.  Omitted group is no schooling.
Attrition between Wave 2 and Wave 5TABLE 4: ARE ATTRITORS MORE MOBILE?
Quarterly Pseudo-Panel Estimates from the ENEU
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Household Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full Non- Full Non- Non-
Sample Attritors Attritors Sample Attritors Attritors Attritors Attritors
Quarterly lag of Log Income 0.991 0.987 0.977 0.857 0.788 0.789 0.821 0.754
T-statistic 157.39 132.22 111.44 43.68 46.84 47 36.51 29.66
Confidence interval [.979,1.003] [.972,1.001] [.960,.994] [ .819,.896] [.755,.821] [.756, .821] [.777,.865] [.704,.804]
Cohort Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort effects restricted to 
be equal for attritors and 
non-attritors: --- --- --- --- Yes Yes No No
Cohort-quarter observations: 638 638 638 638 638 638 638 638
Adjusted R squared: 0.9749 0.9648 0.9512 0.9763 0.9617 0.9617 0.9673 0.956
Notes
Attritors are households that participated in all 5 quarters of the survey
Non-attritors are households that did not participate in all 5 quarters of survey
Columns (5)&(6) were run as one regression where only the slope coefficient was allowed to differ
Columns (7) & (8) were run separately as two regressionsTABLE 5: MOBILITY IN INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
Pseudo-panel estimates from the ENIGH Survey for two year lag
PANEL A: ABSOLUTE MOBILITY (NO COHORT FIXED EFFECTS)
Log Log Log Log
Primary Total Log Log Primary Total Log Log
Wage Monetary Full Full Wage Monetary Full Full
Income Income Income Expenditure Income Income Income Expenditure
Two-year Lag 0.870 0.880 0.859 0.888 0.653 0.641 0.700 0.797
(T-statistic) (14.69) (14.45) (13.20) (15.08) (5.07) (4.91) (5.52) (7.06)
[confidence interval] [.75,.99] [.76,1.00] [.73,.99] [.77,1.01] [.39,.91] [.38,.91] [.44,.96] [.57,1.02]
Cohort-Period 
Observations: 61 61 61 61 40 40 40 40
Adjusted R
2
0.782 0.776 0.743 0.791 0.388 0.372 0.431 0.556
PANEL B: CONDITIONAL MOBILITY (COHORT FIXED EFFECTS)
Log Log Log Log
Primary Total Log Log Primary Total Log Log
Wage Monetary Full Full Wage Monetary Full Full
Income Income Income Expenditure Income Income Income Expenditure
Two-year Lag 0.080 0.061 0.170 0.282 -0.078 -0.032 0.142 0.093
(T-statistic) (0.52) (0.37) (0.98) (1.73) (0.44) (0.17) (0.74) (0.47)
[confidence interval] [-.23, .39] [-.28,.40] [-.18,.52] [-.05,.61] [-.43,.28] [-.42,.36] [-.25,.53] [-.31,.50]
Cohort-Period 
Observations: 61 61 61 61 40 40 40 40
Adjusted R
2
0.838 0.827 0.780 0.824 0.611 0.540 0.530 0.659
Notes:
Absolute value of pseudo-panel t-statistic in parentheses.
Cohorts are defined by 5 year birth interval and three education groups.
Source: own calculations from the 1992-2002 ENIGH surveys.
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